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Dailami and Kim argue that credit subsidies are  Their estimates indicate that -without  interest
ineffective in stimulating business investment in  rate controls and o!-  forms of subsidy,  corpo-
productive assets.  Instead, they Iead to an  rate holdings of speculative assets would have
increase in corporate holdings of finanicial  assets  been one-sevenlth  of observed levels.  Moreover,
and real estate.  most corporate real estate holdings appear to be
unrelated to production activities.
For empirical verification, Dailami and Kim
examined investment patterns in a sample of 241  They find little evidence that the Korean
Korean corporations listed on the Korea Stock  government's  interest rate controls and credit
Exchange between 1984 and 1988. They found  allocation policy have accelerated expansion of
a significant positive relation between corporate  corporate investment.  11  anything, they are
speculative asset holdings and access to subsi-  partly to blame for the overheated Korean stock
dized loans.  market during 1986-88.
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Table 7  .26I.  INTRODUCTION
Govenmnent  intervention  in the pricing and allocation  of credit  remains an enduring  feature
of both developed  and developing  countries. Although  considerable  world-wide  progress  has been
achieved in recent years toward financial liberalization  and open capital markets, goverunents
continue to deploy credit instruments to address a variety of social, political, and economic
problems. In industrialized  countries  govenmments  frequently  intervene  on a broad  scale in efforts
to increase the availability  of loans to students, fanners, and home owners.I  They also extend
loan guarantees  to exporters  and tv large enterprises  in financial  distress. 2
In developing  countries  government  intervention  figures more  prominently. Both loans  at
subsidized interest rates and government loan guarantees are frequently used to encourage
investrnent  and foster industrialization. Goverunents also impose  ceilings on interest rates and
loan  guarantee  fees, provide  cheap  dirct  credit  to targeted  industries,  and bail out fims in financial
distress.
Two basic assumptions  underlie developing  countries' reliance on these strategies. First,
extemalities  in fmancial  markets are presumed  to follow from either market failure and structural
weaknesses--e.g.,  the absence  of weU  organized  equity  and bond markets-and/or from severity  of
information  asynunetries  between  lenders  and borrowers. 3 Second,  it is widely  perceived  that the
PFor  instance, Bosworth, Canron, and Rhyne (1987), Gale (1990, 1991) and a report by the
Congressional Budget Office (1981) describe practices in the  United States. For other
industrialized  countries,  see Teranishi  (1990),  Cox (1986),  and the report of the Joint Economic
Committee  of the U.S. Congress  (1981).
2The best known examples of federal loan guarantees  in the United  States are the Lockheed  and
Chrysler bailouts. See Moritz and Seaman (1981), Ho and Singer (1982), and Chaney and
Thakor (1985). Govenmuent provisions of loan guarantees abound in other industrialized
countries. See, for instance, Green (1985) for the case of France and Sakakibara  and Feldman
(1983) for Japan.
31t is often argued  that financial  internediaries, left alone,  behave  overly conservatively  and deny
crdit  to sone creditworthy  finns with positive  net present  value projects.  The foregoing  of such
projects entails  social welfare costs. This underinvestment problem can be alleviated if
government  iitervention fills the infonnation  gap and facilitats the provision  of long-term  loans
to the appropriate  users. See Stiglitz  (1991)  for an in-depth  discussion  on the market failure  due
to informational  asymmetry  and moral hazzard  problems  and Berkovitch  and Kim (1990)  on the
hiteraction  between  debt  contracts  and  the under-  and over-investnent  incentves.-2-
various debt subsidies  will, by lowering  the cost or increasing  the supply  of funds, induce  fimns  to
expand capital  holdings  in productive  assets such as plants and equipment. These investrnents  are
in tum anticipated  to generate  a higher rate  of employmnent  and  economic  growth.
The objective of this paper is to question the validity of this second assumption. We
suggest that access to low cost borrowing may not necessarily lead to higher investment in
productive  assets,  but rather to investment  in finanzial  and speculative  assets. We elaborate  on the
conditions  under which such an adverse  result may occur, and show that these conditions  are of a
sufficiently  general  natu:re  to warrant  serious  attention  by policymakers.
For empirical verification we focus on investment  pattems in Korea, which provides an
interesting case study for several reasons. It is well known that Korea has relied on financial
market intervention  as an impoitant  policy instrument  for channeling  resources  to priority  sectors
and  firms.  This  strategy, which involves  directed lending through the  Bank of Korea,
subsidization  of debt via interest rate controls, and provision of loan guarantees  at below market
rates, has been a hallmark of Korean industrialization  policy since the 1960s. By exercising
control  over corporate  funding,  the Govenunent  has played an active  role in determining  allocation
of scarce capital. One aspect of this intervention  is the provision of funds to priority sectors at
preferential  rates. A second  aspect  involves  risk sharing  in long-tem investnents. By invesdng  in
a project which had the govenmient's  blessing, a firm can benefit from the guarantee  of a stable
and subsidized  flow of credit, often irrspective of its economic and financial  perfornance. The
result of this policy is a significant  reduction  in the risk of bankruptcy,  which in tum reduces  the
cost of capital  for eligible firms.
How effective has this strategy been? To address this question we proceed in the next
section with a discussion of debt subsidies. We then  provide a simple theoretical  analysis  of the
effect of debt subsidies  on corporate  investment  beha-ior. The analysis  shows  debt subsidies  to be
ineffective in increasing the stock of productive fixed assets.  Instead, subsidies provide an
incentive for fims  to increase their holdings of speculative  assets.  Based on these theoretical
results we develop a testable hypothesis in Section m, which is followed by empirical tests in-3-
Sections  IV and V. The results indicate a significant  positive relation  between  the availability  of
subsidized  loans and corporate  speculative  investment. Section  VI contains  concluding  remaiks.
H.  CORPORATE  DEBT SUBSIDIES AND INVESTMENT  BEHAVIOR
1.  Debt Subsidy
The most obvious forn of debt subsidy is the provision  of funds at below market interest
rates. More subtle implicit  subsidies  arise when there are: (i) official  ceilings  on interest  rates and
loan guarantee fees and (ii) bail-outs of companies in fnancial distress. Effective ceilings on
interest rates and loan guarantee  fees create  excess demand for credit and lead to rationing. If for
some reason (e.g., persuasion by governmental agencies) banks are required to extend or
guarantee  loans to high risk finns within the ceilings,  the firms that are fortunate  enough to obtain
such loans  or guarantees  receive  an implicit  debt subsidy.
To illustrate,  consider  a bank that must eam a ten percent return on its loans to break even.
The bank is contemplating  a loan request  from a firn that has a five percent  probability  of default,
with twenty percent of the loan recoverable  in the event of default. To break even the bank must
charge at least [(1 + .1) - (.2)(.05)]A/1  - .05) - 1 = 14.7%.4 If this rate exceeds the interest rate
ceiling,  the optimal response  for the bank is to deny the loan request. Suppose,  however,  tuit the
bank is required to extend the loan  and that the maximum  rate it can charge is only 11.5  percent. 5
At this pmise  rate, the rate the bank eRt  to receive is (1 + .115)(.95) + (.2)(.0S) - 1 =
4Let
A
R  =  the promised  interest  rate that fully  reflects  the default  risk of the borrower;
p  = the probability  of default;
d  =  the percentage  of the loan recoverable  in the event of defimlt;
R  =  the break-even  return on the bank's  loan  portfolio.
Then  the promised  rate R that  the bank must charge  to break  even is:
R =  (1I  + R) -p * d]/(l - p) - 1.
5The 11.5%  used in this examplc  was the actual  interest rate ceiling  on Korean bank loans  during
the mid 1980s,  which is the sample  period used for our empirical  tests.-4-
6.925%.  Thus, for every dollar loaned, the bank expects to lose 3.075%, and the borrower
receives  an equivalent  implicit  subsidy.
A ceiling on loan guarantee  fees has an identical  effect. Suppose  the borrower  has instead
requested a loan guarantee. Ignoring the costs involved in adninistering loan guarantees, the
minimum  guamantee  fee that the bank must charge in order  to break  even is (1 - .2)(.05)/(l - .05)  =
4.2% of the amount loaned.6 Suppose, however,  that the ceiling on the guarantee fee is only
1.5%  and the bank is required to guarantee  the loan.7 Then for every dollar guaranteed,  the bank
expects to lose .015(1 - .05) - (1 - .2)(0.5) = -2.575%.
In sum, ceilings  on interest  rates and loan  guarantee  fees in combination  with the nonprice
allocation  of credits,  provide  implicit  interest subsidies  to high risk firms.
A final category of debt subsidy arises from govenunent bailouts of fmancially  troubled
firns.  These bailouts  typically  involve  a restructuring  of the fin's  debt in which the govenmment
provides  new capital  at a substantialy below-mrket interest  rate. The new capital  often takes the
formn  of mandated  bank loans. 8
2.  Effects  of  Debt  Subsidy  on  Corporate  Investments
To analyze  the impact  of these explicit  and implicit  debt subsidies  on corporate  investrnent
behavior, we first consider the traditional approach embodied in both the Keynesian and the
neoclassical models of investment. These models reduce the multitude of asset categories  on a
6Let g be the loan guarantee  fee per dollar of borrowing.  Then for each dollar guaranteed  the bank
will eamn  g if the firm does not default, and will lose (I  - d) if the fim  defaults. (See the
preceding footnote for notational  definitions.)  Thus to break even, g must satisfy the following
equation:
g=(l  -d)p/(l  -p)
7The 1.5% in this example was the official ceiling for loan guarantee  fees in Korea for several
years during the 1980s.
8See Kim (1990) for an analysis of the effects of debt subsidies on the fmancing behavior of
Korean corporations  and Ter-nnishi  (1990)  regarding  the nature of government  bailouts  during  the
industrialization  of Japan.-5-
companies'  balance-sheet  to a single  item.9  By concentrating  on one asset,  which  is conventionally
taken to be "productive  fixed  capital",  these  models  can describe  the set of investment  oppommities
available to the firm by means of a single downward sloping marginal efficiency of capital
schedule. Given such a schedule, a lower (marginal)  cost of capital brought about, for instance,
through interest rate subsidies, can readily be shown to induce a higher level of investment in
proxuctive  fixed  capital.
This argument  is illustrated  in Figure 1 which describes  the opportunity  set of investments
facing a representative fimn  Figure I depicts the marginal cost of capital (MCC) line and the
marginal rate of return (MRR) curve.  The marginal cost of capital should be constant in a
competitive capital market. As is typically assuned, the fium  is confronted with a decreasing
marginai rate of return from incremental  fixed investments. Without  interest subsidies,  the profit-
maximizing  finn will invest  up to j*  where  the marginal  cost of capital  is equal to the marginal  rate
of retum.
Suppose, however,  that the fwm  is given an oppommity  to obtain a subsidized  loan in the
amount of X  at the rate of MCC minus k.  The firm's cost of capital  will be reduced by k up to
Xi. Iif X.  is less than the profit maximizing  level of investment,  I*, the subsidy  does not affect
the marginal cost of capital at J* and hence wiU  not increase  the investment  level. The subsidized
loan will only enrich the owners of the firm by an amount kXl  without achieving  the goal of
increasing  the firm's investment  in fixed assets.
Figure 2 depicts the case in which the size of the subsidized  loan (X2) is greater than I.*
Even in this case, it is unlikely  that the fmn will increase  its investment  in fixed assets. Note that
the cost of capital is the opportunity  cost that the owners of the firm forego by not  investing
elsewhere.  In other words, the marginal cost of capital line not only represents the cost of
obtaining funds, but also represents  the investment  opportunity  set available  to the owners  of the
9Theoretically,  such an aggregation  is viable only if all assets on the company  balance sheet are
perfect substitutes.-6-
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Figure  2: The  Impac  of  Subsldlud  Loan  X2 at  MCC  -k
on Corporate  Invesments  In Produtve  Asset: X2 > 1r-7-
finn via "speculative"  assets such as financial assets and real estate. Consequently,  the optimal
investment decision requires investment in fixed assets only up to the original I  with the
remaining  amount  of X2 diverted  to speculative  assets. This investment  path is traced by the bold
line in Figure 2.  As in the previous case, the subsidized  loan will only enrich the owners  of the
firm without  increasing  the firm's investment  in productive  assets.
The objective  of increasing  the level of corporate  investment  beyond I*, say to X2 or I' in
Figure 2, can only be achieved if there is an effective  monitoring  mechanism  that prohibits finns
from investing  the subsidized  loans in anything  other  than the fixed  productive  assets which  yield
rates of return  below the firm's opportunity  cost of capital. This would  require  that (1) the process
of investment is verifiable at every stage throulgh  its completion and (2) there is no collusion
between  the monitoring  agent  and the fimn.
In practice governments monitor investments even if the process of investment is not
veifiable at every stage, and penalze firms  for diverting funds to other uses. While collusion  is
possible, monitoring  agents will require adequate compensation  for the risk of detection. Thus a
profit maximizing firm will weigh the expected penalties and the cost of bribery against the
difference in yields on productive and speculative assets.  Consequently, the greater are the
expected penalties and the cost of bribery, the greater will be the proportion  of subsidized  loans
used to finance productive  assets. In sum, the impact  of debt subsidies  on the investment  behavior
of the recipient  fm  is dependent  on the monitoring  effectiveness  of the govenmment  agency  which
is providing  or mandating  the subsidies.
M.  THE  HYPOTHESIS
1.  The  Model
The theoretical predictions in the preccding section can be fornalized by means of a
switching regression model with a stochastic sample separation  point.  Let us define Yi and Xi
respectively as the amount of investment in speculative assets by fim  i and the net flow of
subsidized loans received by firm i in a given year. Then Figures 1 and 2 imply that, absent anyother sources and uses of funds, Yi will be equal to Xi - 1*i  if Xi >  .*i  and zr-o otherwise. More
generally,  the relation  between  Yi and Xi can be stated  as follows:
Yi  8Po  + 1xi  +  Uii,  if  >  *i  (1)
Yi  a + u2i,  if XiSI*i
where  3o.  P1i  and a are the estimation  parameters. We assune that the error tenns u
2  2  2 and u2i satisfy  the usual  conditions  of E(uli) = E(u2i) = 0, and E(uli) = E(u2i) =  r.
Equation  (1) implies that the relation  between  a firm's investment  in speculative  assets and
its access to subsidized loans depends on whether or not the fim's  supply of subsidized loans
exceeds its desired level of investment in productive assets.  Thus, for furms with X, > 1*i,  a
positive fraction, ,I3, of the subsidized loan is used to finance speculative investment. In the
extreme case in which govenment monitoring  is either nonexistent  or totally ineffective,  profit
maxumzng finns will divert all excess  financing  into speculative  assets.
For the group of firms  for which Xi < 1*i,  we postulate  that P1 = 6. The sample  separation
between the two groups of fims  occurs at the point where Xi = I*i, i.e., the nev supply of
subsidized loans is equal to the desired level of investment  in productive assets. Note that the
location  of this sample  separation  point is not readily  observable  as it depends  on the determinants
of optimal  investment  in productive  assets.
The procedure  for estimating  the switching  regression  model  (1) is well known (See  Kiefer
(1980), Maddala (1983)]. Let the probability that firm i belongs to the group of firms with net
flows of subsidized  loan in excess of I  be:
Pit = Pr(i*<  Xi] = F(iZt2t),  (2)
where Zit is a matrix containing observable determinants  of each firm's optimal investment in
productive  assets and supply of subsidized  loans,  Ot is a corresponding  vector  of parameters,  and
F(-) is the standard  nonnal distribution  function. Potential  candidates  for inclusion  in the matrix  Z
would include the firm's level of output and profits which may be related to the optimal level of
investment  in productive  assets and the finn's access  to subsidized  loans.-9 .
Assume  that a proportion  k of observations  are generated  by regime I and (1 - X)  by regime
II, where regime I represents  the group of firms for which Xi > P*i,  and regime H represents  the
remaining fiins.  Then the likelihood function for an observation Yi can be written as:
L(X,0,l01,A,ax2) = XLI(030 I  9 2) + (I-X)L 2(x,a2),  (3)
where  L  and L2 are respectively  given by
I
L1 =(2s)  a  Iexp{-  I(Yi-  2Ao  21Xi)  . (4)
L1 (2n)  2  1 exp{- 2 (Yi - a)2/a2}.  (5)
Assuming  that u  i and u2i are normally and independendy  distributed,  the likelihood  function  for
observations (Y1.. YN)  is given by
2  N  2  2 L(X,iP  a4Pa,ci  )f  Li(%i,o  ) +(l-X)L 2 i(a,  )  (6)
Maxinizing the log of likelihood  function (6) with respect to its four relevant  arguments,
we obtain:
A WiXiYj  - (WX)(WY)
WXi-  ((7)
Oo  (Y)  - p 1WY  (8)
A  X(l-W  )Yi
E(l  - Wi)
EW.
whereW  =W  -p  - is the condid  probability  of regime  I given Yi; (WX) and
AL 1- + (1-  X)L  i
(  ) ax  3respevely the we  avemp of xi and Yi.-10-
2.  Specification
The estimation of the switching regression model described above involves specifying,
first, the optimal level of productive investment  (1*)  and, second,  the supply of subsidized  loans
(X). To estimate the desired level of investment in productive assets, we rely on the following
standard  model of corporate  invesmennt  behavior.
It =  )Yo  + Yy12Qt -Kt-1) + 73Ft  + vt ,  (11)
where yo,  y1, y2,  y3 are paramneters  to be estimated,  Qt is a finn's level of output as measured  by
sales plus the change ii inventories  of final goods, Kt_I is its capital stock of productive  assets
lagged one year, Ft is a financial  variable  altematively  measured  by either the finn's previous  year
profits or by the first difference  in the firm's value as measured  by the market capitalization  of its
equity. Finally, vt is a disturbance  term.  All variables are scaled by the finr's begining  of year
book value of total assets.
Equation (11) combines  the conventional  accelerator  model with the usual interemporal
adjustment  specification. It also contains  a measure  of profitability  and stock  maket performance
designed  to capture the firn's present  and future  investment  oppo10nties.
If the supply of subsidized  loans  to each firm is observable,  it is possible  to detrmine the
probability,  Pit, that firm  i at time t belongs  to regime  1. Using  equation  (11) we obtain:
Pit  =Prllit*  < X,i1
=Prvt  <Xit  -yo  - yl(y2Qit - Kit_)  - y3Fitd
xit  - yo - yl(y2Qit  - Kit.,)  I,3i  (12)
L  av  a 'V
where  4(s) represents  the unit normal  distribution  function  and o,  is the standard  deviation  of v.
°Pizm  profits  are included  in the micro investment  study  of Tybout  (1985)  for Columbia  and Nabi
(1989) for Pakistan.  The relevance of stock market performance to corporate investment
behavior  in Korea is discussed  in detail in Dailami  (1990).-11-
The quantity of subsidized loans available to individual fims,  however, is not directly
observable. We proxy the subsidized  loans by the sum of short and long term domestic  loans  plus
foreign loans, which we henceforth define as "loans." There are two main justifications for
choosing  this proxy. First, most explicit debt subsidies  for priority industries  and fums have  been
provided through bank loans which are the major source of short and long tern domestic loans.
Foreign  loans are included  because  most carry  explicit govemrnment  guarantees.
Second, the implicit  debt subsidies  due to bailouts and ceilings  on interest rates and loan
guarantee fees mainly apply to loans emanating from banks and other fmancial intermediaries.
Existing interest rate ceilings do not effectively extend to corporate debt instruments with
secondary markets.  For  instance, the  interest rate  ceiling on  corporate bonds  is easily
circumvented by selling new bond issues at a discount.  Furthermore, govenunent bailouts of
fims  in financial  distress  usually  require  bank participation. 'Te new capital  provided in bailouts
often takes the form of postponing  repayment  on old bank debt,  extension  of new bank loans,  and
the provision of loan guarantees  which  allow firms  to obtain  low cost loans outside  of the banking
system.  11
The  identity of the firns  which have benefited from these subsidies is not public
information. Although  the priority industries  were the heavy and chemical  industries  in the 1970s
and the electronics  industry  in the 1980s,  not all frms in these industries  received  equal treatment.
Furthermore,  the eligibility  requirements  for individual  firms  changed  over time as the government
revised  its industrial  policy.
I lfhis  heavy reliance on bank participation  in the bailout process is possible because Korean
banks have been quasi-government  agencies.  Even  after the considerable  progress  made toward
financial  liberalization  in the late 1980s,  bank  presidents  are still appointed  by the govenmnent.-12-
IV.  DATA AND MEASUREMENTS
1.  The Sample
The sample of companies  analyzed  here represents  all non-financial  corporations  that had
been listed on the Korea  Stock Exchange  from 1983  through 1988. The  primary  data source  is the
Pacific-Basin Capital Market (PACAP) Data Base from the University of Rhode Island.  The
PACAP  data is supplemented  by the data provided  by National  Infonnation  and Credit  Evaluation
(NICE) Inc. of Korea.  NICE compiles the raw data from which the PACAP data base is
constructed and hence provides a more detailed breakdown of balance sheet items than does
PACAP.
Due to new listings, delistings, mergers, and bankruptcies,  the number of non-fiancial
frms  listed on the Korea Stock Exchange varies from a low of 275 in 1983 to a high of 441 in
1988. To estimate  the parameters  of equations  (1) and (I1) we require  sufficiently  detailed  balance
sheet, income statement,  and stock  market data for all sample finns  throughout  the sample  period.
Thus, to be included  in the sample, firns must be listed on the Korea Stock  Exchange  throughout
the 1983-88 period, thereby limiting our sample to 241 fims.  The sample covers 27 industries
which account, in  aggregate, for 62.7 percent of the  total market value of non-financial
corporations  listed on the Korea  Stock  Exchange  at the end of 1988.
2.  Subsidized  Loans
As discussed  in the previous  section,  we use the sum of short and long termn  domestic  loans
plus foreign loans to proxy for the firm's supply of subsidized loans.12 The net flow of these
loans received by each finm in a given year is estimated by taking first differences of their
To the extent that some  of these loans  are not subsidized,  our measure  overstates  the true amount
of subsidized loans. Note, however, that in equilibrium risk adjusted rates of return on
speculative  assets are the same as the risk adjusted  cost of non-subsidized  loans; consequently,
furms  have no incentive  to take out non-subsidized  loans  to make speculative  investments.  Ihus
the upward  bias in our estimate  of subsidized  loans works  against  detecting  a significant  relation
between our measure  of subsidized  loans  and speculative  asset holdings.beginnig and end of year  outstanding  balances. 13 Table I shows  that during  the sample  period of
1983-1988,  total domestic and foreign loans account  on average  for about 35 percent of the book
value of firm capital, while debentures account  for about 22 percent. The table also illustrates  a
high  degree of  variability in  the  loan to  asset ratio  across industries.  Firms in  "other
manufacturing"  have  the lowest  average  loan to asset ratio  (9 percent)  while firms  in the rubber  tire
industry  have the highest  (48.9 percent).
3.  Measuring  Investment  in  Speculative  Assets
Detennining what portion of a finm's  assets are being held for speculative  as opposed to
productive  purposes is difficult. Balance sheet information,  even if it were available in greater
detail, could not fully resolve  the issue. Clearly, investments  in certain assets,  such as machinery
and equipment,  can be regarded  as productive,  while investments  in marketable  securities  can be
categorized as speculative. The difficulty  resides in the treatnent of other balance sheet items,
particularly  land and buildings, which can satisfy both productive  and speculative  needs. While
finms  clearly need land and structures  to house their machinery  and equipment,  these assets are at
the same timne  known to be the most popular avenues of speculative investnent for Korean
corporations.
Thus to define speculative  assets,  we classify  total assets into three broad  categories:  14
i) Liquid assets  =  Cash  +  Accounts  and  Notes  Receivable  +
Other  Current  Assets,
ii) Productive  Assets  =  Machinery  and  Equipment  +  Inventories  +  h
(Buildings  and Land),
13See User's Guide of PACAP Database for more precise definitions  of short-term  loans (BAL
11) and long-term loans (BAL 14). The data on foreign loans are obtained from National
Infomation and Credit Evaluation,  Inc. of Korea.
14See User's Guide for the PACAP Database  for the definition of cash (BAL 1), Accounts and
Notes Receivable (BAL 3), Other Current Assets (BAL 5), Inventories  (BAL 4), Marketable
Securities (BAL 2), and Investnents and Other Assets (BAL 8). PACAP Database  does not
separate  fied  assets into machinery  and equipment  versus buildings  and land. These data are
obtained  from National  Information  and  Credit Evaluation.  Inc. of Korea.Table 1
Mean Debt-to-Asset Ratios
For Korean Non-fnancial  Corporations
(Averge  1983 - 1988)
Industry  Number of  Loan to  Debentue to
Companies  Asset Ratio  Asset Ratio
(Mean)  (Mean)
Fishing  2  0.291  0.172
Mkiing  3  0.228  0.173
Food  20  0.307  0.194
Beverage  9  0.259  0.209
Textile  22  0.363  0.284
Apparel& Leather  8  0.407  0.165
Wood & Wood Products  2  0.421  0.071
Paper & Paper Products  10  0.478  0.216
Chemicals  22  0.289  0.267
Rubber & Tire  6  0.489  0.176
Phanuaceuticals  17  0.296  0.212
Plastics  3  0.408  0.246
NonnmaIic  Mlineral  12  0.287  0.293
Iron&Steel  9  0.290  0.173
Nonfeffous Metal  4  0.285  0.183
Fabricaed Metal  4  0.337  0.158
Machiney  8  0.381  0.213
Elecronic & Electrical  20  0.405  0.259
Motor Vehicles & Equipent  5  0.400  0.290
WatchMaidng  2  0.287  0.165
Other Maufbcuring  2  0.090  0.224
Construction  29  0.460  0.141
Wholesale  15  0.362  0.144
Retail Trae  1  0.436  0.184
Land Transpoxtation  3  0.242  0.309
Shipping Aur  Transportation  1  0.302  0.434
Air Transportation  2  0.154  0.536
Total  241  0.353  0.217-15-
iii) Speculative  Assets  =  Marketable Securities + Investments and  Other
Assets  + (1-h) (Buildings  and Land),
where h is a parameter denoting the proportion of the land and buildings category that can be
attributed  to productive  use.
The parameter h is not, of course, directly observable. To estimnate  h we postulate a linear
relation between a firm's productive use of land and buildings  and the level of firm output. This
relation is estimated based on pooled time-series cross section data for the sample of 241
companies  over the 1983-88 period. resulting in 1,446 estimates  of h.15 The overall mean and
median of these estimates  during the sample  period are 0.135 and 0.078.16  To illustrate  a typical
distribution of h, Figure 3 portrays the distribution for 1988, which has a mean and median of
0.126 and 0.075 respectively. These results confirm  our earlier conjecture  that land and buildings
are one of the most popular  means of speculation  for Korean  corporations.
Using the above estimates of h, Table 2 decomposes  total assets into productive, liquid,
and speculative  assets for each of the years 1983  to 1988. The table reveals little variation in the
composition  of corporate assets from year to year.  On average, firm asset allocation  consists of
42.3, 43.5, and 22.2 percent in productive,  liquid, and speculative  assets, respectively. 17
The 43.5 percent for liquid assets appears  large compared  to U.S. data. the average  ratio  of
liquid assets to total assets for U.S. manufacturing, mining, and trade corporations during the
15Specifically,  we estimate  the following  equation:
26  26
(BL)it = O +  F. °. D.j  7lQi  +ll  DiQit  + eit '
j=1 J  '  l  oitOUI..j1  ijt)
where BL = value of building and land assets, Q = output, and D-, j=1,...26, are industry
dummy variables. Note that (1io  + Ti ) measures  the marginal  capital dand  and building)/output
ratio for iadustry  j. We choose the kadustry  with the lowest marginal capital/output  ratio and
denote it by il*. We then generate estimates for h as hit = (fl*)(Qit/BLit),  for t equal to 1983-
1988, and i=l,...,  241.
16Out of the 1446  estimates, 34 estimates  were greater than 1 and one estimate was negative.  We
assign  a value of h=1 for those that were greater  than one, and h=O  for the negative  estimate.
17The surn of the ratios exceeds one hundred  percent because the ratios are obtained by dividing
the end of year balance of each asset category by the beginning of year book value of total
assets.FIGURE 3
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Table  2
Corporate  Asset  Composition:  Ratio of Productive,
Liquid,  and Speculative  Assets  to Total  Assetsa
1983 - 1988
Mean  Asset  Ratiob
Productive  Liquid  Speculative
1983  0.443  0.454  0.205
(0.155)  (0.161)  (0.125)
1984  0.436  0.462  0.229
(0.167)  (0.188)  (0.139)
1985  0.418  0.438  0.221
(0.193)  (0.201)  (0.122)
1986  0.409  0.421  0.213
(0.203)  (0.163)  (0.106)
1987  0.413  0.422  0.224
(0.187)  (0.145)  (0.119)
1988  0.416  0.412  0.237
(0.191)  (0.185)  (0.141)
1983-1988  0.423  0.435  0.222
(0.184)  (0.176)  (0.126)
a. Ratios are obtained  by dividing  the end of the year balances  of asset categories  by the beginning
of the year book value of total assets.
b.  Standard  deviation  in parentheses;  mean and standard  deviation  are based  on the sample  of 241
companies.- It;6-
1983-1988 period is 22%.18  One possible explanation for the larger Korean ratio is the use of
compensating balances to increase the effective bank lending rate.  However, if banks were able to
attain the market clearing rate via compensating balances, there would be no subsidies in domestic
loans and hence no credit rationing.  The implication of no credit rationing clearly contradicts the
chronic shortage of bank credits in Korea.  Furthermore, if the effective interest rates were at the
market  clearing  level,  firms would  not  use domestic  loans  to make  speculative  investments,
because the equilibrium risk adjusted expected returns on speculative assets are equal to the risk
adjusted  cost  of  non-subsidized  loans.  Thus,  if  this  equivalency  held,  there  would  be  no
systematic relation between a frm's  access to domestic loans and its holdings of speculative assets.
Thus,  m estimating  the switching  regression  model  in equation  (1), we are testing  the joint
hypotheses that subsidized loans lead to increased  speculative holdings and that compensating
balances  have  not  completely  circumvented  the  interest  rate  ceilings.  To  the  extent  that
compensating balances reduce the interest subsidies in domestic loans, however, our test contains a
bias against detec,ing a positive relation between subsidized loans and speculative asset holdings.
V.  EMPIRICAL  RESULTS
We report below  our estimates  of the proportion  of speculative  assets held by Korean
corporations that are attributable to the availability of loan subsidies. Since our theoretical analysis
shows that the sample separation point depends on the optimal level of productive invesunents, we
first estimate investment equation (11) utilizing ordinary least squares (OLS) regression methods
and pooled  time-series  cross section  data.  Our regression  model  includes a set  of yearly and
industry  dummies.  Inclusion of the yearly dummies is designed to capture the effect of macro
economic  shocks on corporate  investrnent  behavior; the industry dummies  adjust for industry
differences.
18See Quarterly Financial Report for Manufacturing, Mining, and Trade Corporations (1990). The
definition of liquid assets for U.S. firms is identical to that used for Korean fims.-19-
Table 3 reports the regression  results under two altemative  specifications  for the financial
variable: (1) finn profitability lagged one year, and (2) the first difference  in the finn's market
value of equity.  These fmancial variables are intended to capture the effect of present and
anticipated  future  profitability  on decisions  to invest  in fixed assets.
Several conclusions  emerge from the estimates reported in Table 3.  First, the estimated
coefficients on both output and capital stock are statistically significant and have the expected
signs.  Furthennore, the magnitude of the coefficients  is not sensitive  to the choice of financial
variables: the coefficients  on output and capital stock change respectively  from 0.25 to 0.27 and
from 0.098 to 0.097, as we switch from the use of stock market capitalization  to previous year's
profit.
Second,  the estimated  coefficient  for the financial  variable  is both positive and statistically
significant under either specification. Measuring  profitability by the stock market performance
results in a higher R2. This is not surprising  because  the stock market based measure is forward
looking whereas  the previous  year's profit is backward  looking. The first difference  in the finn's
market value of equity reflects not only current profitability but also the prospects for future
profitability and growth opportunities. Because this variable  proves to be both theoretically  and
empirically  superior,  we conduct the remaining  empirical  analyses  based  on results obtained  with
the stock  market  perfonnance  measure.
Finally, the estimated coefficients for yearly dummies, with the exception of 1987 in
column  (1), are all statiscally insignificant.  This result  indicates  that  the fndainental detenits
of corporate investnent behavior in Korea were not subject to temporal instability during the
sample  period.
We use the estimates reported in column (1) of Table 3 to generate estimates of Pin
equation (12) and calculate esdmates of Po,  P19  a,  and A as described in equations (7) through
(10).l9  The results are reported  in Table 4.  The estimated value of 1  is positive and significant,
T 9 his estimation  process  requires  the assumption  that supplies  of subsidized  loans are detemiined
exogenously.-20-
Table  3
Regression  Coefficients  on the Detenninants  of Corporate  Investment  in Productive  Assets
(Dependent  variable: ratio  of investment  in productive
assets to the beginiing of year book value of assets)
Independent  variables  (1)  (2)
output  0.25  0.27
(2.52)  (2.49
capital  stock  0.098  0.097
(2.87 )  ( 2.80)
stock  market  0.243
capitalization  (6.76)
profits  - 0.206
(2.81 )
constant  0.062  0.041
(2.63)  (1.62)
Year Dummies:
1985  0.002  0.0002
(0.018)  (0.02)
1986  -0.011  -0.006
( 1.01 )  ( 0.53 )
1987  -0.024  -0.0007
2.13  (0.06 )
1988  -0.017  0.006
(1.5)  (0.52)
R2 0.146  0.118
N  1199  1199
Dependent  variable  mean  0.056  0.056
Note:  1)  sample consists of 241 in 1984, 240 in 1985.  238 In 1986. 231 in 1987.  and
241 in 1988,  non-financial  cosporetions  Listed  on the Korea stock exchange.
covering 27 indusires.
2)  26 induutty dummies  were  included in the estimation  but an  not tepode  in the table.
Absolute values of t-statietics  are in parnthoes.-21-
Table  4
The Relation  between  Firm Speculative  Asset Holdings  and
Subsidized  Loans  with Exogenous  Loan  Supply: 1984  through  1988
(Dependent  variable: ratio  of investment  in speculative  assets
to the beginining  of year book  value of total assets)
1984  1985  1986  1987  1988
Subsidized  loans  (Pi)  0.254  0.175  0.0612  0.2S9  0.193
(4.26)  (5.63)  (4.74)  (9.10)  (3.02)
Constant: regime I  (Po)  0.0271  0.0219  0.0243  0.0178  0.0444
(2.59)  (2.82)  (7.01)  (3.58)  (4-54)
Constant: regime II  (a)  0.0501  0.0219  0.0141  0.0278  0.0373
(11.98)  (10.42)  (6.25)  (8.12)  (6.61)
Proportion  of frms in
regime I  (X)  0.527  0.488  0.441  0.423  0.363
(30.23)  (28.59)  (27.44)  (25.93)  (22.32)
Number  of finns  241  240  238  238  241
Absolute  values  of t- statistics  are in parentheses.-22-
supporting  our hypothesis  of a positive  relation  between  level of speculative  investment  and access
to subsidized loans.  The point estimates of 1  indicate that the proportion of subsidized loans
diverted to speculative  assets ranges from a high of 0.289 in 1987  to a low of 0.06 in 1986. For
the 1984-88  period as whole, the average value of 0, is 0.194, indicating  that about one-fifth of
each dollar of subsidized  loans is used for speculative  purposes. The remaining  four-fifths  is used
to finance  liquid and productive  assets.
The proportion of firms receiving  subsidized  loans in excess of their optimal productive
investments,  i.e., fiums  in regime I, declines  systematically  over time from 53% of the sample  in
1984  to 36% in 1988. Thus it appears  that there has been a steady improvemen in the allocational
efficiency of capital.  One possible source of explanation is the steps taken toward financial
liberalization  in the latter  half of the 1980s.
Table 4 also shows that the constant terms 00 and a are significantly positive, but the
magnitudes  are small. The average  values of P  and a during  the 19841988 period are 0.027 and
0.030, indicating that, on average, fims  hold about 3% of assets in speculative categories
irrespective  of the availability  af subsidized  loans. Possible  reasons for these investments  include
the cross holding  of shares  held for control  purpose and  the temporary  investment  of excess  cash.
Recall that Table 2 shows that on average 22% of corporate assets are in speculation
categories. Comparison  of that 22% with the 3% for the constant terms in Table 4 indicates  that
most corporate investment  in speculative  assets is due to the availability  of subsidized  loans. Hlad
there been complete financial liberalization such that all interest rates were competitively
detemiined, the fraction of corporate assets invested in speculative  assets would  have been about
one-seventh  of observed  levels.
To assess the sensitivity  of our findings  to the estimation  method used to separate  holdings
of buildings and land between productive and speculative purposes, we rerun the switching
regression model under two extreme assumptions: (1) all buildings and land were held for
speculative purposes, i.e., hit = 0, and (2) all were for productive purpose, i.e., hit = 1, for all
finns over the entire sample  period. Table 5 contains  the resulting  estimauts  for the coefficients  P 1-23-
and A. As expected, the estimates  of P, are much higher under the assumptien  h  0  O  than under
the assumption  h = 1. More interestingly,  the assumption  h = 0 increases  the estimates  of P, and
X only slighdy from those in Table 4. Even under  the extreme  assunption of h=l, the estimates  of
P1 remain significantly  posidve in two out of five years, and the estimates  of X continue to be
significant  throughout  the sample  period.
The results reported in Tables 4 and 5 assume that subsidized loans must be invested in
either productive,  liquid,  or speculative  assets. This need not be so. The subsidized  loans  can also
be used to retire  higher  cost loans and equity. The end result  would  be identical  to that achieved  by
the diversion  of subsidized  loans to speculative  assets: the loans would  only enrich  the borrower
without increasing investment in productive assets.  To account for this possibility, we treat
declines in other liabilities and equity as increases in speculative assets.  Table 6 shows that
declines in other liabilities and equity occur frequently and with some yearly variadon.  Of 241
firns, the number  of finns experiencing  such declines  ranges from 26 in 1983 to 61 in 1985.
Table 7 reports the estimates  of P 1, o,  a and A  using the revised definidon  of changes  in
speculative  assets. The results generally  approximate  those reported in Table 4.  However, P 1 is
higher in 1984 and 1985 and lower in 1987 and 1988 when compared with estimates  using the
previous  defnition of speculative  assets. Table  7 provides  a clearer  pattem  of secular  decline  in P 1
from a high of 0.327 in 1984 to 0.161 during the 1986-1988  period. Apparently,  the proportion
of subsidized  loans  put into speculative  uses declined  by about half after 1986. This declining  use
of subsidized  loans for speculative  purposes  may be due to the dramatic  increase in profitability
experienced  during the 1986-1988  period. The so-called  three lows--low  inflation,  low oil price,
and low exchange rate--during the 1986-1988  period, have reinvigorated  the Korean economic
miracle. 20 The increase in profitability due to the three lows, together with the relaxation of
20Tb  average annual real GNP growth rate was 6.9% during 1984-1985 and an astounding
12.1%  during 1986-1988.-24-
Table 5
Estimated Coefficients for ,I1 and k
Under Altemative Measures of Speculative Assets
Coefficient:  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988
Subsidizd  Loans  (P)
(i): all land and buildings  0.257  0.185  0.066  0.295  0.196
assumed to be speculative  (4.29)  (5.87)  (5.13)  (9.25)  (3.07)
(h=0)
(ii):  all land and buildings  0.106  0.006  0.009  0.026  -0.013
assumed to be productive  (4.50)  (0.96)  (1.39)  (1.89)  (0.79)
(h=l)
Propoion  of Filnmsi
(i):  all land and buildings  0.530  0.491  0.444  0.428  0.366
assumed to be speculative  (30.46)  (28.71)  (27.41)  (26.10)  (22.45)
(h=O)
(ii):  all land and buildings  0.459  0.436  0.390  0.397  0.330
assumed to be productive  (29.05)  (28.31)  (27.74)  (27.57)  (23.40)
(h=l)
Absolute values of t- statistics are in parentheses.-25-
Table  6
Frequency  of Negative  anu  Positive  Changes  in Other  Capital  a
(1983-1988)
Year  Negative  Positive  Total
1983  26  215  241
1984  56  185  241
1985  61  180  241
1986  50  191  241
1987  32  209  241
1988  26  215  241
a  Other  capital  is defined  as totad  assets minus  subsidize loans.-26-
Table  7
The Relion  Between  Finm  Specuadve Asset  Holdings
and Subsidized  Loans under  the Altenative  Defiition  of Speculative  Assets a
1984  1985  1986  1987  1988
Subsidized  Loans ()  0.327  0.204  0.066  0.250  0.168
(4.78)  (6.05)  (4.53)  (7.34)  (2.64)
Constant RegmneI(no)  0.042  0.041  0.041  0.033  0.055
(3.50)  (4.95)  (10.40)  (6.25)  (5.61)
Constant:  Regime  H (a)  0.060  0.033  0.022  0.036  0.045
(13.92)  (13.13)  (8.51)  (9.96)  (10.28)
Proportion  of Firms  0.527  0.488  0.444  0.424  0.364
in Regine I (X)  (30.22)  (28.58)  (27.46)  (25.93)  (22.32)
Number  of Finrs  241  240  238  239  241
a: Changes  in specuative assets include  the decline  in other  capital,  where  other  capital  is defined  as
total assets minus subsidized  loans.
Absolute  values  of t-statistics  are in parentheses.-27-
interest rate controls in the latter part of the 1980s, may have reduced the incentive to divert
subsidized  loans to nonproductive  uses. 21
VI.  CONCLUSIONS
This paper develops a theoretical  model which predicts that, absent effective  government
monitoring,  subsidized  corporate  loans will not lead to greater investment  in productive  assets  and
instead will be diverted into speculative assets.  To test this hypothesis we investigate Korean
corporate  behavior  between 1984  and 1988.
We find a significant  positive relation  between corporate  investmnents  in speculative  assets
and access to subsidized  loans. About  one-fifth  of aU  subsidized  loans appear  to have been  used to
finance speculative investments. The remaing  amount apparently  was used as intended.  to
fuiance fixed and liquid assets. In addition, we fimd  that a substantial  number of Korean firms
were allocated considerably more subsidized loans than were required for the acquisition of
productive investments.
Our estimates indicate that an overwhelming  proportion of corporate speculative asset
holdings  are induced  by the availability  of subsidized  loans. It appears  that, had interest rates  been
competitively  detemined, the share  of corporate  assets  devoted  to speculative  holdings  would  have
been one-seventh  of that actually observed. Furthermore,  a substantial  fraction  of corporate  real
estate holdings appears to be unrelated to production activity:  our estimates indicate that on
average, 86.5% of all corporate real estate holdings were motivated by speculative  purposes. 22
These results imply that corporate investmenets  in speculative  assets are both excessive and are
induced by the availability of subsidized loans.  Thus, if the Korean stock market was indeed
21Consistent with the above conjecture,  new equity offerings increased substantially  starting in
1986.  See Kim and Lee (1990)  for firther discussion  on issuing  stocks  in Korea.
22Although 86.5%  may appear  at first glance to be extremely  high, it is not inconsistent  with the
prior impression  one receives from reading Korean daily economic  newspapers.  Even a casual
perusal reveals persistent press criticism regarding excessive real estate holdings by large
corporations. Although these criticisms are based on anecdotal evidence, they have led to
govemment  policies forcing  a massive liquidation  of corporate  real estate  holdings. As of this
writing,  the forced liquidations  are still underway.-28-
overheated  during the sample  period, the government's  credit  allocation  policy and debt subsidies
are at least  partly to blame.23
Our estimate of the extent to which subsidized  loans were diverted to speculative  assets
may be biased downward  due to possible  measurement  errors in the data. The errors arise because
the identity of individual  subsidized loans is not public information  and because compensating
balances  may have been used to increase  effective  interest rates. Depending  on the magnitude  of
those measurement  errors,  our proxy for subsidized  loans overstates  the quantity  of debt subsidies
and biases the result toward finding no relation between subsidized  loans and speculative  asset
holdings.
Finally, what are the implications of our fmdings for developing  economies in general?
Did Korea achieve its economic miracle because of, or in spite of, its credit allocation policy?
Although  analyzing  the underlying  causes of Korea's  economic  miracle  is beyond the scope  of this
paper, we believe  that Korea's  credit allocation  policy  has been at best a coincidemal  feature  of the
Korean success story. Our data reveal a clear pattem of secular decline  in the proportion  of fmns
receiving  more subsidized  loans  than are needed  for productive  investment,  from a high of 0.54 in
1984  to 0.36 in 1988. In contrast,  the average  annual real GNP growth  rate increased  from 6.99o
during 1984-1985  to 12.1%  during 1986-1988.
If anything, the key factors providing the impetus for high economic  growth after 1986
were the so-called  three lows,  low inflation,  low  oil price, and low  exchange  rate, which prevailed
from 1986 through the end of our sample period.  These three lows represent favorable macro
shocks  that have  drastically  enhanced  the profitability  of real  investments.  ITe increase  in expected
profitability in tum has increased the incentives for corporations to invest available funds in
productive  assets. Our data  support this conjcture:  the proportion  of subsidized  loans diverted  to
speculative investments declined from 27% during the pre-three-low  era (1984-1985) to 16%
23The average  rate of retum for all stocks  listed on the Korean Stock  Exchange  during the 1984-
1988  period was 56% per year. See Kim and Lee  (1990)  for firther details.-29-
during the post-three-low  era (1986-1988). In conclusion,  we find little evidence supporting  the
contention  that subsidized  loans  have contributed  to corporate  investment  boom  in Korea.-30-
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